Epistemological-Scientific Realism and the Onto-Relationship of Inferentially Justified and Non-Inferentially Justified Beliefs
Max L. E. Andrews

TL;DR
This paper explores the relationship between reality and justified beliefs, emphasizing the importance of epistemological realism and examining inference methods within foundationalist and coherentist models in a theistic context.
Contribution
It proposes an integrated view of epistemological realism connecting ontology with justification, and analyzes inference strategies in belief formation.
Findings
Highlights the importance of onto-relationships in epistemology
Discusses the role of inference in foundationalist and coherentist models
Emphasizes the significance of epistemological realism in understanding knowledge
Abstract
The traditional concept of knowledge is a justified true belief. The bulk of contemporary epistemology has focused primarily on that task of justification. Truth seems to be a quite obvious criterion-does the belief in question correspond to reality? My contention is that the aspect of ontology is far too separated from epistemology. This onto-relationship between reality and beliefs require the epistemic method of epistemological realism. This is not to diminish the task of justification. I will then discuss the role of inference from the onto-relationships of free invention and discovery and whether it is best suited for a foundationalist or coherentist model within a theistic context.
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Taxonomy
TopicsPhilosophy and History of Science
