Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Yongkui Liu, Xiaojie Chen, Lin Zhang, Long Wang, Matjaz Perc

TL;DR
This paper introduces an aspiration-based win-stay-lose-learn strategy updating rule in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, which promotes cooperation robustly even from minimal initial cooperation, challenging traditional strategy change assumptions.
Contribution
It proposes a simple, intuitive strategy update rule based on aspiration, demonstrating its effectiveness in fostering cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games.
Findings
Win-stay-lose-learn rule promotes cooperation.
Even minimal initial cooperation can lead to highly cooperative states.
Results are supported by simulations and pair approximation analysis.
Abstract
Holding on to one's strategy is natural and common if the later warrants success and satisfaction. This goes against widespread simulation practices of evolutionary games, where players frequently consider changing their strategy even though their payoffs may be marginally different than those of the other players. Inspired by this observation, we introduce an aspiration-based win-stay-lose-learn strategy updating rule into the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. The rule is simple and intuitive, foreseeing strategy changes only by dissatisfied players, who then attempt to adopt the strategy of one of their nearest neighbors, while the strategies of satisfied players are not subject to change. We find that the proposed win-stay-lose-learn rule promotes the evolution of cooperation, and it does so very robustly and independently of the initial conditions. In fact, we show that even a minute…
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