Scalable Mechanisms for Rational Secret Sharing
Varsha Dani, Mahnush Movahedi, Jared Saia

TL;DR
This paper introduces scalable, non-cryptographic mechanisms for rational secret sharing that significantly reduce communication complexity and latency, ensuring Nash equilibrium for large groups of agents.
Contribution
It presents two new mechanisms for rational secret sharing that are scalable, requiring only O(log n) bits per agent and O(log n) latency, improving over previous methods.
Findings
Mechanisms are Nash equilibria for n > 2.
Require only O(log n) bits per agent.
Achieve O(log n) latency, much faster than previous methods.
Abstract
We consider the classical secret sharing problem in the case where all agents are selfish but rational. In recent work, Kol and Naor show that, when there are two players, in the non-simultaneous communication model, i.e. when rushing is possible, there is no Nash equilibrium that ensures both players learn the secret. However, they describe a mechanism for this problem, for any number of players, that is an epsilon-Nash equilibrium, in that no player can gain more than epsilon utility by deviating from it. Unfortunately, the Kol and Naor mechanism, and, to the best of our knowledge, all previous mechanisms for this problem require each agent to send O(n) messages in expectation, where n is the number of agents. This may be problematic for some applications of rational secret sharing such as secure multi-party computation and simulation of a mediator. We address this issue by…
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Taxonomy
TopicsCryptography and Data Security · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs · Privacy-Preserving Technologies in Data
