Mechanism Design for Base Station Association and Resource Allocation in Downlink OFDMA Network

TL;DR

This paper develops a decentralized, incentive-compatible mechanism for resource allocation and user association in multi-cell downlink OFDMA networks, achieving at least half of the optimal throughput despite the NP-hardness of the problem.

Contribution

It introduces a computationally feasible, truthful, and dynamic mechanism for joint base station association and resource allocation in OFDMA networks, with performance guarantees.

Findings

Mechanism ensures user truthfulness and spectrum efficiency.

Achieves at least 50% of the optimal throughput.

Simulation results confirm effectiveness of the proposed approach.

Abstract

We consider a resource management problem in a multi-cell downlink OFDMA network, whereby the goal is to find the optimal per base station resource allocation and user-base station assignment. The users are assumed to be strategic/selfish who have private information on downlink channel states and noise levels. To induce truthfulness among the users as well as to enhance the spectrum efficiency, the resource management strategy needs to be both incentive compatible and efficient. However, due to the mixed (discrete and continuous) nature of resource management in this context, the implementation of any incentive compatible mechanism that maximizes the system throughput is NP-hard. We consider the dominant strategy implementation of an approximately optimal resource management scheme via a computationally tractable mechanism. The proposed mechanism is decentralized and dynamic. More importantly, it ensures the truthfulness of the users and it implements a resource allocation solution that yields at least 1/2 of the optimal throughput. Simulations are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the performance of the proposed mechanism.