On a Reliable Peer-Review Process
Arthur Carvalho, Kate Larson

TL;DR
This paper introduces a Bayesian-based peer-review process that incentivizes truthful review disclosures through a scoring system, aiming to improve review reliability and consensus accuracy.
Contribution
It presents a novel Bayesian model and scoring mechanism that promote honest reviews and facilitate consensus in peer review.
Findings
Reviewers maximize expected scores by truthful reporting
The scoring system encourages honest disclosures under mild assumptions
The method improves review reliability and consensus formation
Abstract
We propose an enhanced peer-review process where the reviewers are encouraged to truthfully disclose their reviews. We start by modelling that process using a Bayesian model where the uncertainty regarding the quality of the manuscript is taken into account. After that, we introduce a scoring function to evaluate the reported reviews. Under mild assumptions, we show that reviewers strictly maximize their expected scores by telling the truth. We also show how those scores can be used in order to reach consensus.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications · Multi-Agent Systems and Negotiation
