On individual neutrality and collective decision making
Mu Zhu, Shangsi Wang, Lu Xin

TL;DR
This paper presents a mathematical theory demonstrating that for two decision-makers to collaborate effectively, at least one must sometimes remain neutral, offering a formal justification for a common counseling principle.
Contribution
It introduces a simple mathematical model explaining the necessity of neutrality in effective joint decision-making.
Findings
Collaboration improves when at least one entity is occasionally neutral.
Neutrality is mathematically justified as beneficial for collective decision quality.
The theory supports traditional counseling advice about neutrality in partnerships.
Abstract
We derive a simple mathematical "theory" to show that two decision-making entities can work better together only if at least one of them is occasionally willing to stay neutral. This provides a mathematical "justification" for an age-old cliche among marriage counselors.
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Taxonomy
TopicsMachine Learning and Algorithms · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
