Time Synchronization Attack in Smart Grid-Part II: Cross Layer Detection Mechanism

TL;DR

This paper presents a cross-layer detection mechanism for time synchronization attacks in smart grids, combining physical layer spoofing detection with upper layer trustworthiness evaluation to improve security.

Contribution

It introduces a novel cross-layer detection approach that integrates GPS C/No based spoofing detection with trustworthiness assessment for PMUs in smart grids.

Findings

Effective detection of TSA demonstrated in experiments.

Physical and upper layer algorithms successfully integrated.

Improved security in smart grid monitoring systems.

Abstract

A novel time synchronization attack (TSA) on wide area monitoring systems in smart grid has been identified in the first part of this paper. A cross layer detection mechanism is proposed to combat TSA in part II of this paper. In the physical layer, we propose a GPS carrier signal noise ratio (C/No) based spoofing detection technique. In addition, a patch-monopole hybrid antenna is applied to receive GPS signal. By computing the standard deviation of the C/No difference from two GPS receivers, a priori probability of spoofing detection is fed to the upper layer, where power system state is estimated and controlled. A trustworthiness based evaluation method is applied to identify the PMU being under TSA. Both the physical layer and upper layer algorithms are integrated to detect the TSA, thus forming a cross layer mechanism. Experiment is carried out to verify the effectiveness of the proposed TSA detection algorithm.