Cryptanalysis of a one round chaos-based Substitution Permutation Network

TL;DR

This paper critically analyzes a recent chaos-based encryption scheme, revealing that simply integrating chaotic systems into cryptographic architectures does not inherently ensure security, highlighting fundamental vulnerabilities.

Contribution

It demonstrates that a one round chaos-based Substitution Permutation Network cannot guarantee security, emphasizing limitations of chaotic cryptography when used alone.

Findings

The cryptosystem is vulnerable to cryptanalysis.

Including chaos does not eliminate security flaws.

One round architecture is insufficient for security.

Abstract

The interleaving of chaos and cryptography has been the aim of a large set of works since the beginning of the nineties. Many encryption proposals have been introduced to improve conventional cryptography. However, many proposals possess serious problems according to the basic requirements for the secure exchange of information. In this paper we highlight some of the main problems of chaotic cryptography by means of the analysis of a very recent chaotic cryptosystem based on a one round Substitution Permutation Network. More specifically, we show that it is not possible to avoid the security problems of that encryption architecture just by including a chaotic system as core of the derived encryption system.