TL;DR
This paper explores the history and efficiency of cake cutting mechanisms, focusing on a game-theoretic analysis that links equilibria with existing mechanisms for piecewise uniform preferences.
Contribution
It introduces a game-theoretic framework for analyzing cake cutting mechanisms and shows that its equilibria align with known mechanisms under certain preferences.
Findings
Equilibria of the proposed game match existing cake cutting mechanisms.
The analysis applies specifically to piecewise uniform preferences.
The study highlights the strategic stability of certain cake cutting allocations.
Abstract
We examine the history of cake cutting mechanisms and discuss the efficiency of their allocations. In the case of piecewise uniform preferences, we define a game that in the presence of strategic agents has equilibria that are not dominated by the allocations of any mechanism. We identify that the equilibria of this game coincide with the allocations of an existing cake cutting mechanism.
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Economics of Agriculture and Food Markets