Voting Power : A Generalised Framework
Sreejith Das, Iead Rezek

TL;DR
This paper introduces a measure theoretic framework for Voting Power Theory, simplifying various indices into three core probabilities, applicable across all voting games and decision rules.
Contribution
It presents a unified, generalizable framework that replaces multiple voting power measures with three fundamental probabilities, broadening applicability.
Findings
Framework simplifies voting power measurement
Universal applicability to all voting games
Reduces complexity of existing indices
Abstract
This paper examines an area of Game Theory called Voting Power Theory. With the adoption of a measure theoretic framework it argues that the many different indices and tools currently used for measuring voting power can be replaced by just three simple probabilities. The framework is sufficiently general to be applicable to every conceivable type of voting game, and every possible decision rule.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications · Sports Analytics and Performance
