Infinite dimensional mixed economies with asymmetric information

TL;DR

This paper characterizes Walrasian expectations allocations in infinite-dimensional asymmetric information economies with mixed agents and Banach space commodities, and restores a Vind's theorem for economies with only negligible agents.

Contribution

It provides a novel characterization of Walrasian expectations allocations using veto power and solves a longstanding problem on the private core with exact feasibility.

Findings

Characterization of Walrasian expectations allocations via veto power

Restoration of Vind's theorem for economies with only negligible agents

Addresses a question posed by Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García

Abstract

In this paper, we study asymmetric information economies consisting of both non-negligible and negligible agents and having ordered Banach spaces as their commodity spaces. In answering a question of Herv\'{e}s-Beloso and Moreno-Garc\'{i}a, we establish a characterization of Walrasian expectations allocations by the veto power of the grand coalition. It is also shown that when an economy contains only negligible agents a Vind's type theorem on the private core with the exact feasibility can be restored. This solves a problem of Pesce.