The Price of Matching Selfish Vertices
Yuval Emek, Tobias Langner, Roger Wattenhofer
TL;DR
This paper investigates the efficiency of stable matchings in selfish vertex scenarios, analyzing how individual preferences impact the overall cost through the concepts of price of anarchy and stability.
Contribution
It introduces a framework for analyzing minimum-cost perfect matchings with selfish vertices using Gale-Shapley stability and cost-based preferences.
Findings
Quantifies the price of anarchy and stability in this setting.
Provides bounds on the efficiency loss due to selfish behavior.
Highlights the impact of individual preferences on global optimality.
Abstract
We analyze the setting of minimum-cost perfect matchings with selfish vertices through the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS) lens. The underlying solution concept used for this analysis is the Gale-Shapley stable matching notion, where the preferences are determined so that each player (vertex) wishes to minimize the cost of her own matching edge.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Voting Systems · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications