A general model of the public goods dilemma
Steven A. Frank

TL;DR
This paper develops a general model of the public goods dilemma, highlighting how resource variation and baseline success influence individual contributions and group success, with implications for understanding social behavior and cooperation.
Contribution
It introduces two novel aspects: resource-based stratification in contributions and the impact of baseline success on public good production, expanding existing public goods theory.
Findings
Resource variation leads to social stratification in contributions.
Higher baseline success increases pressure to produce public goods.
Models suggest simple tests for resource effects and baseline success.
Abstract
An individually costly act that benefits all group members is a public good. Natural selection favors individual contribution to public goods only when some benefit to the individual offsets the cost of contribution. Problems of sex ratio, parasite virulence, microbial metabolism, punishment of noncooperators, and nearly all aspects of sociality have been analyzed as public goods shaped by kin and group selection. Here, I develop two general aspects of the public goods problem that have received relatively little attention. First, variation in individual resources favors selfish individuals to vary their allocation to public goods. Those individuals better endowed contribute their excess resources to public benefit, whereas those individuals with fewer resources contribute less to the public good. Thus, purely selfish behavior causes individuals to stratify into upper classes that…
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