On the game interpretation of a shadow price process in utility maximization problems under transaction costs

TL;DR

This paper explores the concept of shadow prices in utility maximization with transaction costs, introducing a generalized shadow price via relaxed utility functions and establishing its existence and relation to game theory.

Contribution

It introduces the notion of a generalized shadow price using relaxed utility functions and proves its existence under weak assumptions, linking it to saddle points in a market game.

Findings

Existence of generalized shadow prices under weak conditions

Relation between shadow prices and saddle points in a zero-sum game

Illustrative examples of shadow price concepts

Abstract

To any utility maximization problem under transaction costs one can assign a frictionless model with a price process $S^*$, lying in the bid/ask price interval $[\underline S, \bar{S}]$. Such process $S^*$ is called a \emph{shadow price} if it provides the same optimal utility value as in the original model with bid-ask spread. We call $S^*$ a \emph{generalized shadow price} if the above property is true for the \emph{relaxed} utility function in the frictionless model. This relaxation is defined as the lower semicontinuous envelope of the original utility, considered as a function on the set $[\underline S, \bar{S}]$, equipped with some natural weak topology. We prove the existence of a generalized shadow price under rather weak assumptions and mark its relation to a saddle point of the trader/market zero-sum game, determined by the relaxed utility function. The relation of the notion of a shadow price to its generalization is illustrated by several examples. Also, we briefly discuss the interpretation of shadow prices via Lagrange duality.