Secondary Spectrum Auctions for Symmetric and Submodular Bidders
Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim

TL;DR
This paper introduces the first truthful auction mechanisms for secondary spectrum allocation with symmetric and submodular valuations, achieving near-optimal approximation bounds under various interference models.
Contribution
It develops novel truthful mechanisms for spectrum auctions with symmetric and submodular valuations, using conflict graph models and LP-rounding techniques for improved approximation guarantees.
Findings
Achieves O(rho)-approximate mechanisms for unweighted conflict graphs.
Provides O(rho (log n + log k))-approximate mechanisms for weighted conflict graphs.
Demonstrates promising initial results for deterministic truthful mechanisms.
Abstract
We study truthful auctions for secondary spectrum usage in wireless networks. In this scenario, n communication requests need to be allocated to k available channels that are subject to interference and noise. We present the first truthful mechanisms for secondary spectrum auctions with symmetric or submodular valuations. Our approach to model interference uses an edge-weighted conflict graph, and our algorithms provide asymptotically almost optimal approximation bounds for conflict graphs with a small inductive independence number rho << n. This approach covers a large variety of interference models such as, e.g., the protocol model or the recently popular physical model of interference. For unweighted conflict graphs and symmetric valuations we use LP-rounding to obtain -approximate mechanisms; for weighted conflict graphs we get a factor of O(rho (log n + log k)). For…
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