A Unifying Tool for Bounding the Quality of Non-Cooperative Solutions in Weighted Congestion Games

TL;DR

This paper introduces a primal-dual technique for analyzing the quality of solutions in weighted congestion games, providing a unified, simpler approach to bounding equilibrium inefficiencies across various latency functions.

Contribution

The paper develops a versatile primal-dual framework that simplifies and unifies the analysis of solution quality bounds in weighted congestion games, including new bounds for polynomial latency functions.

Findings

Unified bounds for prices of anarchy and stability for affine latency functions.

First known upper bounds for price of stability with quadratic and cubic latency functions.

Simplified proofs and construction of matching lower bounds using the primal-dual approach.

Abstract

We present a general technique, based on a primal-dual formulation, for analyzing the quality of self-emerging solutions in weighted congestion games. With respect to traditional combinatorial approaches, the primal-dual schema has at least three advantages: first, it provides an analytic tool which can always be used to prove tight upper bounds for all the cases in which we are able to characterize exactly the polyhedron of the solutions under analysis; secondly, in each such a case the complementary slackness conditions give us an hint on how to construct matching lower bounding instances; thirdly, proofs become simpler and easy to check. For the sake of exposition, we first apply our technique to the problems of bounding the prices of anarchy and stability of exact and approximate pure Nash equilibria, as well as the approximation ratio of the solutions achieved after a one-round walk starting from the empty strategy profile, in the case of affine latency functions and we show how all the known upper bounds for these measures (and some of their generalizations) can be easily reobtained under a unified approach. Then, we use the technique to attack the more challenging setting of polynomial latency functions. In particular, we obtain the first known upper bounds on the price of stability of pure Nash equilibria and on the approximation ratio of the solutions achieved after a one-round walk starting from the empty strategy profile for unweighted players in the cases of quadratic and cubic latency functions. We believe that our technique, thanks to its versatility, may prove to be a powerful tool also in several other applications.