Multi-Issue Negotiation with Deadlines
S. S. Fatima, N. R. Jennings, M. J. Wooldridge

TL;DR
This paper analyzes various negotiation procedures for multi-issue bilateral negotiations with deadlines and uncertainty, showing that the package deal is optimal and Pareto efficient despite higher computational complexity.
Contribution
It provides a comprehensive equilibrium analysis of three negotiation procedures under time constraints and uncertainty, establishing the optimality of the package deal.
Findings
Package deal yields Pareto optimal outcomes.
It has similar agreement times to the simultaneous procedure.
Generates a unique outcome under specific conditions.
Abstract
This paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested autonomous agents. Now, there are a number of different procedures that can be used for this process; the three main ones being the package deal procedure in which all the issues are bundled and discussed together, the simultaneous procedure in which the issues are discussed simultaneously but independently of each other, and the sequential procedure in which the issues are discussed one after another. Since each of them yields a different outcome, a key problem is to decide which one to use in which circumstances. Specifically, we consider this question for a model in which the agents have time constraints (in the form of both deadlines and discount factors) and information uncertainty (in that the agents do not know the opponents utility function). For this model, we consider issues that are both independent…
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