Disentangling Social and Group heterogeneities: Public Goods games on Complex Networks

TL;DR

This paper introduces a new framework for studying Public Goods games on complex networks by separating social network structure from group formation, revealing that social heterogeneity's effect on cooperation depends on game parameters.

Contribution

It presents a novel approach to model groups with specific sizes embedded in heterogeneous social networks, challenging previous assumptions about heterogeneity fostering cooperation.

Findings

Social heterogeneity may not always promote cooperation.

Group size and network heterogeneity influence game outcomes.

The framework allows for more realistic modeling of social interactions.

Abstract

In this Letter we present a new perspective for the study of the Public Goods games on complex networks. The idea of our approach is to consider a realistic structure for the groups in which Public goods games are played. Instead of assuming that the social network of contacts self-defines a group structure with identical topological properties, we disentangle these two interaction patterns so to deal with systems having groups of definite sizes embedded in social networks with a tunable degree of heterogeneity. Surpisingly, this realistic framework, reveals that social heterogeneity may not foster cooperation depending on the game setting and the updating rule.