Multi-Unit Auction with Diminishing Marginal Valuations and Capacities
Riccardo Colini Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi, Guido Schaefer
TL;DR
This paper investigates multi-unit auction mechanisms considering diminishing marginal valuations and capacity constraints, aiming to improve auction efficiency and fairness.
Contribution
It introduces a novel auction model that accounts for diminishing valuations and capacities, providing new insights into optimal auction design.
Findings
Proposes a new auction mechanism accommodating capacities.
Analyzes the impact of diminishing valuations on auction outcomes.
Provides theoretical bounds for auction efficiency.
Abstract
This paper has been withdrawn by the author.
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Supply Chain and Inventory Management