Information Flow Safety in Multiparty Sessions
Sara Capecchi (University of Torino), Ilaria Castellani (INRIA Sophia, Antipolis M\'editerran\'ee), Mariangiola Dezani-Ciancaglini (University of, Torino)
TL;DR
This paper introduces a calculus for multiparty sessions with security levels, using monitored semantics to prevent information leaks and ensure safety, aligning with noninterference principles.
Contribution
It presents a novel monitored semantics for multiparty session calculus that enforces information flow safety and demonstrates its relation to established noninterference properties.
Findings
Monitored semantics effectively blocks information leaks in multiparty sessions.
Safety property ensures noninterference in the calculus.
Examples illustrate practical enforcement of security levels.
Abstract
We consider a calculus for multiparty sessions enriched with security levels for messages. We propose a monitored semantics for this calculus, which blocks the execution of processes as soon as they attempt to leak information. We illustrate the use of our monitored semantics with various examples, and show that the induced safety property implies a noninterference property studied previously.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.