Specialists and Generalists: Equilibrium Skill Acquisition Decisions in Problem-solving Populations
Katharine A. Anderson

TL;DR
This paper models the decision-making process behind individuals choosing to become specialists or generalists, revealing how problem complexity and barriers influence optimal skill acquisition and societal welfare.
Contribution
It introduces a theoretical framework analyzing conditions that favor specialization versus generalization, highlighting the impact of problem difficulty and organizational constraints.
Findings
Workers tend to specialize in single-dimensional problems with open disciplinary boundaries.
Barriers to cross-field work promote generalist strategies for simple problems.
Societal optimality favors maintaining some generalists despite individual incentives to specialize.
Abstract
Many organizations rely on the skills of innovative individuals to create value, including academic and government institutions, think tanks, and knowledge-based firms. Roughly speaking, workers in these fields can be divided into two categories: specialists, who have a deep knowledge of a single area, and generalists, who have knowledge in a wide variety of areas. In this paper, I examine an individual's choice to be a specialist or generalist. My model addresses two questions: first, under what conditions does it make sense for an individual to acquire skills in multiple areas, and second, are the decisions made by individuals optimal from an organizational perspective? I find that when problems are single-dimensional, and disciplinary boundaries are open, all workers will specialize. However, when there are barriers to working on problems in other fields, then there is a tradeoff…
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