On the evolution of phenomenal consciousness
Jean-Louis Dessalles (INFRES, LTCI), Tiziana Zalla (CREA)

TL;DR
This paper explores the nature and evolution of phenomenal consciousness, proposing it as an adaptive feature involved in labeling and evaluating mental representations, with implications for understanding its evolutionary purpose.
Contribution
It introduces a theory that phenomenal consciousness evolved to facilitate mental labeling and evaluation, arguing against it being merely an epiphenomenon.
Findings
Phenomenal consciousness is likely an evolved feature.
It plays a role in discriminating and evaluating mental representations.
Consciousness has been selected for its labeling function.
Abstract
A number of concepts are included in the term 'consciousness'. We choose to concentrate here on phenomenal consciousness, the process through which we are able to experience aspects of our environment or of our physical state. We probably share this aspect of consciousness with many animals which, like us, feel pain or pleasure and experience colours, sounds, flavours, etc. Since phenomenal consciousness is a feature of some living species, we should be able to account for it in terms of natural selection. Does it have an adaptive function, or is it an epiphenomenon ? We shall give arguments to reject the second alternative. We propose that phenomenal properties of consciousness are involved in a labelling process that allows us to discriminate and to evaluate mental representations. We also discuss to what extent consciousness as such has been selected for this labelling function.
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Taxonomy
TopicsOlfactory and Sensory Function Studies
