Collaborative Network Formation in Spatial Oligopolies
Shaun Lichter, Terry Friesz, Christopher Griffin

TL;DR
This paper investigates the stability of collaboration networks among firms in spatial oligopolies, identifying conditions for arbitrary degree sequence graphs to be stable collaboration structures.
Contribution
It establishes conditions under which any arbitrary degree sequence graph can be a stable collaboration network among firms in spatial oligopolies.
Findings
Certain degree sequences lead to stable collaboration networks
Conditions for stability depend on firms' strategic interactions
Flexible network structures can be stable in oligopolistic markets
Abstract
Recently, it has been shown that networks with an arbitrary degree sequence may be a stable solution to a network formation game. Further, in recent years there has been a rise in the number of firms participating in collaborative efforts. In this paper, we show conditions under which a graph with an arbitrary degree sequence is admitted as a stable firm collaboration graph.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications · Digital Platforms and Economics
