Market Mechanisms with Non-Price-Taking Agents
Ali Kakhbod
TL;DR
This paper introduces a decentralized resource allocation mechanism for non-price-taking agents with concave utilities, ensuring budget balance, individual rationality, and convergence to optimal solutions in complex network settings.
Contribution
It presents a novel decentralized mechanism that works without an auctioneer, applicable to networks with general topology and diverse service needs.
Findings
Mechanism is always budget balanced.
Mechanism converges to the optimal centralized solution.
Applicable to networks with general topology.
Abstract
The paper develops a decentralized resource allocation mechanism for allocating divisible goods with capacity constraints to non-price-taking agents with general concave utilities. The proposed mechanism is always budget balanced, individually rational, and it converges to an optimal solution of the corresponding centralized problem. Such a mechanism is very useful in a network with general topology and no auctioneer where the competitive agents/users want different type of services.
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Taxonomy
TopicsEconomic theories and models · Game Theory and Applications · Digital Platforms and Economics