A power-weighted variant of the EU27 Cambridge Compromise

TL;DR

This paper introduces a power-weighted variant of the EU27 Cambridge Compromise for seat allocation, which avoids capping by applying non-linear downweighting to population figures, offering a different approach to proportional representation.

Contribution

It proposes a novel power-weighted method for seat allocation that bypasses the traditional capping step, with detailed calculations and constitutional analysis.

Findings

The variant successfully allocates seats without capping.

It maintains proportionality through non-linear downweighting.

The method has distinct constitutional advantages.

Abstract

The Cambridge Compromise composition of the European Parliament allocates five base seats to each Member State's citizenry, and apportions the remaining seats proportionately to population figures using the divisor method with rounding upwards and observing a 96 seat capping. The power-weighted variant avoids the capping step, proceeding instead by a progressive non-linear downweighting of the population figures until the largest State is allocated exactly 96 seats. The pertinent calculations of the variant are described, and its relative constitutional merits are discussed.