Attacker Control and Impact for Confidentiality and Integrity
Aslan Askarov (Cornell University), Andrew Myers (Cornell University)

TL;DR
This paper introduces a semantic framework for security policies involving declassification and endorsement, characterizing attacker influence on confidentiality and integrity, and providing enforceable security type systems.
Contribution
It proposes a novel semantic framework defining attacker control and impact, improving security guarantees for declassification and endorsement mechanisms in language-based security.
Findings
Framework captures attacker influence on confidentiality and integrity.
Security type system enforces the new security conditions.
Applicable to data sanitization and authentication examples.
Abstract
Language-based information flow methods offer a principled way to enforce strong security properties, but enforcing noninterference is too inflexible for realistic applications. Security-typed languages have therefore introduced declassification mechanisms for relaxing confidentiality policies, and endorsement mechanisms for relaxing integrity policies. However, a continuing challenge has been to define what security is guaranteed when such mechanisms are used. This paper presents a new semantic framework for expressing security policies for declassification and endorsement in a language-based setting. The key insight is that security can be characterized in terms of the influence that declassification and endorsement allow to the attacker. The new framework introduces two notions of security to describe the influence of the attacker. Attacker control defines what the attacker is able…
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