Comment on "Cryptanalysis and improvement of multiparty quantum secret sharing schemes"

TL;DR

This paper analyzes the security of Zhang et al.'s quantum secret sharing scheme, demonstrating that a known attack by Wang et al. does not compromise the scheme's security, thus showing its robustness.

Contribution

It provides a critical assessment of Wang et al.'s attack, proving its ineffectiveness against Zhang et al.'s quantum secret sharing scheme.

Findings

Wang et al.'s attack fails to eavesdrop all secret messages in Zhang et al.'s scheme.

The Zhang et al. scheme remains secure against the specific attack analyzed.

The paper clarifies the security limitations of the attack in the context of the scheme.

Abstract

We show that, using Wang et al. attack [T.-y. Wang, Q.-y. Wen, F. Gao, S. Lin, F.-c. Zhu, Phys. Lett. A 373 (2008) 65], the first agent and the last agent cannot eavesdrop all the secret messages in Zhang et al. QSSCM scheme [Z.-j. Zhang, G. Gao, X. Wang, L.-f Han, S.-h. Shi, Opt. Commun. 269 (2007) 418]. In some sense, Wang et al. attack is unsuccessful for Zhang et al. QSSCM scheme.