Optimization with Demand Oracles
Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren

TL;DR
This paper develops demand oracle-based algorithms for combinatorial procurement auctions, achieving improved approximation ratios over classical greedy methods, including near-optimal bounds for subadditive valuations.
Contribution
It introduces demand oracle algorithms that surpass the classic e/(e-1) approximation barrier for procurement problems, including non-monotone and subadditive valuations.
Findings
Achieves approximation ratio of 9/8+ε for general problems
Attains ratio of 9/8 for cardinality constraints
Proves near-optimality requiring exponential demand queries for ratios below 2
Abstract
We study \emph{combinatorial procurement auctions}, where a buyer with a valuation function and budget wishes to buy a set of items. Each item has a cost and the buyer is interested in a set that maximizes subject to . Special cases of combinatorial procurement auctions are classical problems from submodular optimization. In particular, when the costs are all equal (\emph{cardinality constraint}), a classic result by Nemhauser et al shows that the greedy algorithm provides an approximation. Motivated by many papers that utilize demand queries to elicit the preferences of agents in economic settings, we develop algorithms that guarantee improved approximation ratios in the presence of demand oracles. We are able to break the barrier: we present algorithms that use only polynomially many demand…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Optimization and Search Problems · Complexity and Algorithms in Graphs
