Security problem on arbitrated quantum signature schemes
Jeong Woon Choi, Ku-Young Chang, Dowon Hong

TL;DR
This paper identifies security vulnerabilities in existing arbitrated quantum signature schemes that use quantum one-time encryption, demonstrating a forgery attack and proposing a method to enhance security.
Contribution
The paper reveals a security flaw in current quantum signature schemes and offers a straightforward approach to defend against the identified forgery attack.
Findings
Existential forgery attack on current schemes
Vulnerability due to reliance on quantum one-time encryption
Proposed method to recover security against forgery
Abstract
Until now, there have been developed many arbitrated quantum signature schemes implemented with a help of a trusted third party. In order to guarantee the unconditional security, most of them take advantage of the optimal quantum one-time encryption method based on Pauli operators. However, we in this paper point out that the previous schemes only provides a security against total break and actually show that there exists a simple existential forgery attack to validly modify the transmitted pair of message and signature. In addition, we also provide a simple method to recover the security against the proposed attack.
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
