Group Incentives and Rational Voting

TL;DR

This paper models how group-based incentives and strategic prize allocation influence voter turnout and group competition, revealing conditions for stable support and implications for political strategies.

Contribution

It introduces a model of group incentives in voting, analyzing how contingent prizes and punishments affect equilibrium behavior and group formation.

Findings

Prize allocation to the most supportive group stabilizes only with two groups.

Punishment-based competition remains stable with any number of groups.

Voters influence prize distribution, affecting turnout even in non-competitive elections.

Abstract

Our model describes competition between groups driven by the choices of self-interested voters within groups. Within a Poisson voting environment, parties observe aggregate support from groups and can allocate prizes or punishments to them. In a tournament style analysis, the model characterizes how contingent allocation of prizes based on relative levels of support affects equilibrium voting behavior. In addition to standard notions of pivotality, voters influence the distribution of prizes across groups. Such prize pivotality supports positive voter turnout even in non-competitive electoral settings. The analysis shows that competition for a prize awarded to the most supportive group is only stable when two groups actively support a party. However, competition among groups to avoid punishment is stable in environments with any number of groups. We conclude by examining implications for endogenous group formation and how politicians structure the allocation of rewards and punishments.