False-name-proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team
Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Mahyar Salek, Makoto Yokoo

TL;DR
This paper introduces and analyzes new false-name-proof auction mechanisms for hiring teams of agents, ensuring truthful reporting of ownership and costs, with proven bounds and experimental evaluation.
Contribution
It presents two novel false-name-proof mechanisms for different ownership scenarios, with theoretical bounds and experimental validation.
Findings
Frugality ratio bounded by 2^n for special case
Mechanism for multiple ownership with reserve cost
Experimental results on payment and surplus
Abstract
We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purchase a feasible solution by conducting an auction. Our goal is to design auctions that are truthful and false-name-proof, meaning that it is in the agents' best interest to reveal ownership of all elements (which may not be known to the auctioneer a priori) as well as their true incurred costs. We first propose and analyze a false-name-proof mechanism for the special case where each agent owns only one element in reality, but may pretend that this element is in fact a set of multiple elements. We prove that its frugality ratio is bounded by , which, up to constants, matches a lower bound of for all false-name-proof mechanisms in this scenario. We then propose a second mechanism for the…
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Taxonomy
TopicsAuction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications
