On (Some) Explanations in Physics
James Owen Weatherall

TL;DR
The paper discusses a specific type of explanation in physics that accounts for the equality of inertial and gravitational mass, highlighting its significance in guiding theoretical development beyond standard philosophical accounts.
Contribution
It introduces a novel perspective on explanations in physics, emphasizing their role in motivating future theories and their relation to diachronic theory development.
Findings
Proposes a new explanation for mass equality in Newtonian physics.
Highlights the importance of this explanation in shaping future physical theories.
Argues that this explanation type is not covered by standard philosophical accounts.
Abstract
I offer one possible explanation of why inertial and gravitational mass are equal in Newtonian gravitation. I then argue that this is an example of a kind of explanation that is not captured by standard philosophical accounts of scientific explanation. Moreover, this form of explanation is particularly important, at least in physics, because demands for this kind of explanation are used to motivate and shape research into the next generation of physical theories. I suggest that explanations of the sort I describe reveal something important about one way in which physical theories can be related diachronically.
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Taxonomy
TopicsPhilosophy and History of Science · Science and Climate Studies · Quantum Mechanics and Applications
