Highly lopsided information and the Borel hierarchy
Samuel Alexander

TL;DR
This paper explores the limits of perfect information in games, focusing on when a player with super-perfect information can guarantee a win in a hierarchy of lopsided-information guessing games.
Contribution
It provides an exact characterization of winning strategies for the player with super-perfect information in a specific class of lopsided guessing games.
Findings
Identifies conditions for guaranteed winning strategies
Establishes a hierarchy of information levels in games
Connects game theory with the Borel hierarchy
Abstract
In a game where both contestants have perfect information, there is a strict limit on how perfect that information can be. By contrast, when one player is deprived of all information, the limit on the other player's information disappears, admitting a hierarchy of levels of lopsided perfection of information. We turn toward the question of when the player with super-perfect information has a winning strategy, and we exactly answer this question for a specific family of lopsided-information games which we call guessing games.
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Taxonomy
TopicsComputability, Logic, AI Algorithms · Advanced Topology and Set Theory · Economic theories and models
