Monotone Operator Methods for Nash Equilibria in Non-Potential Games
Luis M. Briceno-Arias, Patrick L. Combettes

TL;DR
This paper introduces monotone operator methods to find Nash equilibria in non-potential games, providing new splitting algorithms with proven convergence for various game types.
Contribution
It develops novel splitting techniques for monotone inclusion problems related to Nash equilibria in non-potential games, with convergence guarantees.
Findings
Effective algorithms for generalized Nash equilibria
Convergence proofs for proposed methods
Applications to zero-sum and cyclic proximity problems
Abstract
We observe that a significant class of Nash equilibrium problems in non-potential games can be associated with monotone inclusion problems. We propose splitting techniques to solve such problems and establish their convergence. Applications to generalized Nash equilibria, zero-sum games, and cyclic proximity problems are demonstrated.
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Taxonomy
TopicsOptimization and Variational Analysis · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Game Theory and Applications
