Noncooperatively Optimized Tolerance: Decentralized Strategic Optimization in Complex Systems
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Jackson Mayo, Robert Armstrong, Joseph Ruthruff

TL;DR
This paper introduces noncooperatively optimized tolerance (NOT), a game-theoretic extension of HOT, demonstrating how strategic interactions influence robustness, landscape structure, and criticality in complex systems like forest fire models.
Contribution
It develops a new model, NOT, that generalizes HOT by incorporating strategic interactions, revealing complex behaviors including features of self-organized criticality and robustness.
Findings
Model retains HOT features like robustness and high yield.
Emergence of self-organized criticality with many players.
Robustness persists despite increased system fragmentation.
Abstract
We introduce noncooperatively optimized tolerance (NOT), a generalization of highly optimized tolerance (HOT) that involves strategic (game theoretic) interactions between parties in a complex system. We illustrate our model in the forest fire (percolation) framework. As the number of players increases, our model retains features of HOT, such as robustness, high yield combined with high density, and self-dissimilar landscapes, but also develops features of self-organized criticality (SOC) when the number of players is large enough. For example, the forest landscape becomes increasingly homogeneous and protection from adverse events (lightning strikes) becomes less closely correlated with the spatial distribution of these events. While HOT is a special case of our model, the resemblance to SOC is only partial; for example, the distribution of cascades, while becoming increasingly…
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