Intervention in Power Control Games With Selfish Users
Yuanzhang Xiao, Jaeok Park, Mihaela van der Schaar

TL;DR
This paper proposes intervention-based incentive schemes to regulate selfish users' power levels in wireless ad hoc networks, ensuring efficient power control and reducing interference.
Contribution
It introduces a novel intervention scheme framework with dynamic adjustment processes for power control in networks with selfish users, including analysis of perfect and imperfect monitoring.
Findings
Intervention schemes can achieve any positive power profile with perfect monitoring.
Imperfect monitoring leads to performance loss.
Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of intervention rules.
Abstract
We study the power control problem in wireless ad hoc networks with selfish users. Without incentive schemes, selfish users tend to transmit at their maximum power levels, causing significant interference to each other. In this paper, we study a class of incentive schemes based on intervention to induce selfish users to transmit at desired power levels. An intervention scheme can be implemented by introducing an intervention device that can monitor the power levels of users and then transmit power to cause interference to users. We mainly consider first-order intervention rules based on individual transmit powers. We derive conditions on design parameters and the intervention capability to achieve a desired outcome as a (unique) Nash equilibrium and propose a dynamic adjustment process that the designer can use to guide users and the intervention device to the desired outcome. The…
Peer Reviews
No public reviews on file for this paper yet. If you reviewed it on a platform where reviews are public (OpenReview, ICLR, NeurIPS, ICML), you can paste yours below so the community can read it here.
Videos
No videos yet. Explain this paper in a talk, walkthrough, or lecture? Add one.
