On stability in dynamical Prisoner's dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates

TL;DR

This paper investigates the stability of evolutionary dynamics in a non-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates, deriving conditions for coexistence and dominance of cooperation.

Contribution

It introduces a stability condition involving interaction rates and benefit-cost ratios, highlighting how increasing interaction rates favors cooperation.

Findings

Cooperation dominates as interaction rates r1, r3 approach infinity.

Derived stability condition (b+c/b-c)^2 < r1*r3 for coexistence.

Higher interaction rates lead to the dominance of cooperation.

Abstract

Stability of evolutionary dynamics of non-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game with non-uniform interaction rates [1], via benefit and cost dilemma is studied . Moreover, the stability condition (b+c/b-c)2 < r1r3 is derived in case of coexistence between cooperators and defectors .If r1,r3 -> infinity cooperation is the dominant strategy and defectors can no longer exploit cooperators.