Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution
Nitin Jain, Christoffer Wittmann, Lars Lydersen, Carlos Wiechers,, Dominique Elser, Christoph Marquardt, Vadim Makarov, Gerd Leuchs

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates how improper device calibration in quantum key distribution systems can create security vulnerabilities, and proposes a method to exploit this flaw along with a potential fix.
Contribution
It introduces a novel attack exploiting calibration routines in QKD systems and suggests a practical countermeasure to enhance security.
Findings
Calibration routines can be manipulated to create security loopholes.
An attack using faked states can break QKD security.
A proposed fix can mitigate the calibration-based attack.
Abstract
Characterizing the physical channel and calibrating the cryptosystem hardware are prerequisites for establishing a quantum channel for quantum key distribution (QKD). Moreover, an inappropriately implemented calibration routine can open a fatal security loophole. We propose and experimentally demonstrate a method to induce a large temporal detector efficiency mismatch in a commercial QKD system by deceiving a channel length calibration routine. We then devise an optimal and realistic strategy using faked states to break the security of the cryptosystem. A fix for this loophole is also suggested.
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