Mixed Extensions of decision-form games
David Carf\`i, Angela Ricciardello

TL;DR
This paper introduces the canonical mixed extension of decision form games, focusing on mixed equilibria, with potential applications across various fields where systems react to external actions without natural utility functions.
Contribution
It defines and motivates the concept of mixed extensions in decision form games, providing foundational examples and exploring equilibrium properties.
Findings
Introduction of the canonical mixed extension concept
Analysis of mixed equilibria in finite decision form games
Potential applications in diverse scientific fields
Abstract
In this paper we define the canonical mixed extension of a decision form game. We motivate the necessity to introduce this concept and we show several examples about the new concept. In particular we focus our study upon the mixed equilibria of a finite decision form game. Many developments appear possible for applications to economics, physics, medicine and biology in those cases for which the systems involved do not have natural utility functions but are only capable to react versus the external actions.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models · Game Theory and Voting Systems
