Coding for Cryptographic Security Enhancement using Stopping Sets

TL;DR

This paper introduces a channel coding scheme using stopping sets in LDPC codes to increase cryptographic security by making ciphertext more difficult to decode for eavesdroppers, even with better channel conditions.

Contribution

It proposes a novel coding design that leverages stopping sets to enhance cryptographic secrecy and extends security analysis to multiple receivers and collaborative attackers.

Findings

Coding scheme increases eavesdropper's decoding difficulty.

Design criteria reduce maximum-likelihood attack effectiveness.

Security enhancement persists even with superior eavesdropper channels.

Abstract

In this paper we discuss the ability of channel codes to enhance cryptographic secrecy. Toward that end, we present the secrecy metric of degrees of freedom in an attacker's knowledge of the cryptogram, which is similar to equivocation. Using this notion of secrecy, we show how a specific practical channel coding system can be used to hide information about the ciphertext, thus increasing the difficulty of cryptographic attacks. The system setup is the wiretap channel model where transmitted data traverse through independent packet erasure channels with public feedback for authenticated ARQ (Automatic Repeat reQuest). The code design relies on puncturing nonsystematic low-density parity-check codes with the intent of inflicting an eavesdropper with stopping sets in the decoder. Furthermore, the design amplifies errors when stopping sets occur such that a receiver must guess all the channel-erased bits correctly to avoid an expected error rate of one half in the ciphertext. We extend previous results on the coding scheme by giving design criteria that reduces the effectiveness of a maximum-likelihood attack to that of a message-passing attack. We further extend security analysis to models with multiple receivers and collaborative attackers. Cryptographic security is enhanced in all these cases by exploiting properties of the physical-layer. The enhancement is accurately presented as a function of the degrees of freedom in the eavesdropper's knowledge of the ciphertext, and is even shown to be present when eavesdroppers have better channel quality than legitimate receivers.