Cryptanalysis of three matrix-based key establishment protocols

TL;DR

This paper critically analyzes and breaks down the security of three matrix-based key establishment protocols, revealing vulnerabilities in protocols proposed over the past two decades.

Contribution

It provides the first cryptanalysis of three different matrix-based key protocols, exposing their weaknesses and advancing understanding of their security limitations.

Findings

All three protocols are vulnerable to cryptanalysis.

The paper demonstrates specific attack methods for each protocol.

It highlights the need for more secure matrix-based cryptographic schemes.

Abstract

We cryptanalyse a matrix-based key transport protocol due to Baumslag, Camps, Fine, Rosenberger and Xu from 2006. We also cryptanalyse two recently proposed matrix-based key agreement protocols, due to Habeeb, Kahrobaei and Shpilrain, and due to Romanczuk and Ustimenko.