Coexistence of cooperators and defectors in well mixed populations mediated by limiting resources

TL;DR

This paper demonstrates that resource limitations can dynamically alter payoffs in evolutionary games, enabling stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors in well-mixed populations, contrary to traditional assumptions.

Contribution

It introduces a novel mechanism where resource constraints induce neutral payoffs, allowing coexistence in a setting previously thought to favor defectors.

Findings

Resource limitations can modify payoff structures.

Coexistence of cooperators and defectors is possible in well-mixed populations.

A self-organizing process leads to neutral evolutionary dynamics.

Abstract

Traditionally, resource limitation in evolutionary game theory is assumed just to impose a constant population size. Here we show that resource limitations may generate dynamical payoffs able to alter an original prisoner's dilemma, and to allow for the stable coexistence between unconditional cooperators and defectors in well-mixed populations. This is a consequence of a self-organizing process that turns the interaction payoff matrix into evolutionary neutral, and represents a resource-based control mechanism preventing the spread of defectors. To our knowledge, this is the first example of coexistence in well-mixed populations with a game structure different from a snowdrift game.