Peer-to-Peer Multimedia Sharing based on Social Norms
Yu Zhang, Mihaela van der Schaar

TL;DR
This paper introduces a new incentive protocol for P2P multimedia sharing that uses social norms and reputation schemes to promote cooperation and improve sharing efficiency, especially in large, anonymous networks.
Contribution
It designs and analyzes a novel family of social norm-based incentive protocols tailored for P2P multimedia sharing networks, addressing their unique challenges.
Findings
Optimal social norms significantly enhance sharing efficiency.
The protocols incentivize content contribution over free-riding.
Impact of punishment schemes on social welfare is analyzed.
Abstract
Empirical data shows that in the absence of incentives, a peer participating in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) network wishes to free-riding. Most solutions for providing incentives in P2P networks are based on direct reciprocity, which are not appropriate for most P2P multimedia sharing networks due to the unique features exhibited by such networks: large populations of anonymous agents interacting infrequently, asymmetric interests of peers, network errors, and multiple concurrent transactions. In this paper, we design and rigorously analyze a new family of incentive protocols that utilizes indirect reciprocity which is based on the design of efficient social norms. In the proposed P2P protocols, the social norms consist of a social strategy, which represents the rule prescribing to the peers when they should or should not provide content to other peers, and a reputation scheme, which rewards…
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Taxonomy
TopicsPeer-to-Peer Network Technologies · Caching and Content Delivery · Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
