On Communication Protocols that Compute Almost Privately
Marco Comi, Bhaskar DasGupta, Michael Schapira, Venkatakumar, Srinivasan

TL;DR
This paper investigates privacy-preserving communication protocols in auctions, introducing dissection protocols that approximate privacy effectively for certain functions like the second-price auction, with connections to computational geometry.
Contribution
It generalizes the approximate privacy model, introduces dissection protocols, and proves their effectiveness for tiling functions under specific distributions.
Findings
Dissection protocols achieve constant average-case privacy ratios for tiling functions.
Good privacy approximation ratios are not achievable in the worst case.
Connections between privacy frameworks and computational geometry are established.
Abstract
A traditionally desired goal when designing auction mechanisms is incentive compatibility, i.e., ensuring that bidders fare best by truthfully reporting their preferences. A complementary goal, which has, thus far, received significantly less attention, is to preserve privacy, i.e., to ensure that bidders reveal no more information than necessary. We further investigate and generalize the approximate privacy model for two-party communication recently introduced by Feigenbaum et al.[8]. We explore the privacy properties of a natural class of communication protocols that we refer to as "dissection protocols". Dissection protocols include, among others, the bisection auction in [9,10] and the bisection protocol for the millionaires problem in [8]. Informally, in a dissection protocol the communicating parties are restricted to answering simple questions of the form "Is your input between…
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