Cryptanalysis of two mutual authentication protocols for low-cost RFID
Mohammad Hassan Habibi, Mahmoud Gardeshi, Mahdi R. Alaghband

TL;DR
This paper analyzes two recent low-cost RFID mutual authentication protocols, revealing security flaws like desynchronization and privacy issues, thereby highlighting the need for more secure RFID authentication methods.
Contribution
The paper provides a security analysis of two new RFID authentication protocols, identifying vulnerabilities and demonstrating potential attacks.
Findings
Both protocols are susceptible to desynchronization attacks.
Privacy vulnerabilities are present in the analyzed protocols.
The security flaws compromise the protocols' effectiveness.
Abstract
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is appearing as a favorite technology for automated identification, which can be widely applied to many applications such as e-passport, supply chain management and ticketing. However, researchers have found many security and privacy problems along RFID technology. In recent years, many researchers are interested in RFID authentication protocols and their security flaws. In this paper, we analyze two of the newest RFID authentication protocols which proposed by Fu et al. and Li et al. from several security viewpoints. We present different attacks such as desynchronization attack and privacy analysis over these protocols.
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