Sanctioning by Institution, Skepticism of Punisher and the Evolution of Cooperation

TL;DR

This paper investigates how institutional sanctioning, combined with skeptical punishers who cooperate based on team composition, can promote the evolution of cooperation where peer sanctioning fails, using stochastic adaptive dynamics.

Contribution

It introduces a model where skeptical punishers and institutional sanctions facilitate cooperation evolution, differing from traditional models assuming always-cooperative punishers.

Findings

Institutional sanctioning can promote cooperation where peer sanctioning cannot.

Skeptical punishers' cooperation depends on team composition.

The model shows cooperation evolves under certain conditions with institutional sanctions.

Abstract

This article aims to clarify the case and the mechanism where sanction or punishment by institution can deliver the evolution of cooperation. Compared to peer sanctioning, institutional sanctioning may be sensitive to players' attitude toward players who do not pre-commit punishment. Departed from former studies based on the punisher who always acts cooperatively, we assume that the punishing player is skeptical in that she cooperates in proportion to how many same types join in her team. Relying on stochastic adaptive dynamics, we show that institutional sanctioning coupled with skeptical punisher can make cooperation evolve for the case where peer sanctioning may not.