Public Announcements in Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets
Krzysztof R. Apt, Jonathan A. Zvesper

TL;DR
This paper generalizes the concept of public announcements in strategic games to include arbitrary strategy sets and various optimality notions, distinguishing between announcements of optimality and rationality.
Contribution
It introduces a broad framework for public announcements applicable to diverse strategic games and optimality concepts, extending previous work limited to specific cases.
Findings
Framework covers arbitrary strategy sets
Distinguishes between optimality and rationality announcements
Applicable to various optimality notions
Abstract
In [Van Benthem 2007] the concept of a public announcement is used to study the effect of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We offer a simple generalisation of this approach to cover arbitrary strategic games and many optimality notions. We distinguish between announcements of optimality and announcements of rationality.
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Taxonomy
TopicsGame Theory and Applications · Auction Theory and Applications · Economic theories and models
