Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols
Lars Lydersen, Johannes Skaar, Vadim Makarov

TL;DR
This paper demonstrates how tailored bright illumination attacks can compromise distributed-phase-reference quantum key distribution protocols by exploiting detector linear modes, expanding the scope of potential vulnerabilities beyond BB84-based systems.
Contribution
It introduces a novel attack method using bright tailored illumination on distributed-phase-reference protocols, highlighting new security challenges.
Findings
Bright tailored illumination can effectively eavesdrop on distributed-phase-reference protocols.
The attack exploits the linear mode of avalanche photodiodes in detectors.
Security vulnerabilities extend beyond traditional BB84 protocols.
Abstract
Detector control attacks on quantum key distribution systems exploit the linear mode of avalanche photodiode in single photon detectors. So far, the protocols under consideration have been the BB84 protocol and its derivatives. Here we present how bright tailored illumination exploiting the linear mode of detectors can be used to eavesdrop on distributed-phase-reference protocols, such as differential-phase-shift and coherent-one-way.
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