Mean Field Equilibrium in Dynamic Games with Complementarities

TL;DR

This paper analyzes stochastic dynamic games with strategic complementarities, establishing conditions for mean field equilibrium existence, and demonstrating convergence and sensitivity properties in large-player settings.

Contribution

It introduces necessary conditions for mean field equilibrium existence in games with complementarities and explores their properties, including monotonicity and convergence under natural learning dynamics.

Findings

Existence of mean field equilibrium under certain conditions

Existence of largest and smallest equilibria with nondecreasing strategies

Players converge to equilibria via myopic learning dynamics

Abstract

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical distribution of the states of other players. Such games can be used to model a diverse set of applications, including network security models, recommender systems, and dynamic search in markets. Stochastic games are generally difficult to analyze, and these difficulties are only exacerbated when the number of players is large (as might be the case in the preceding examples). We consider an approximation methodology called mean field equilibrium to study these games. In such an equilibrium, each player reacts to only the long run average state of other players. We find necessary conditions for the existence of a mean field equilibrium in such games. Furthermore, as a simple consequence of this existence theorem, we obtain several natural monotonicity properties. We show that there exist a "largest" and a "smallest" equilibrium among all those where the equilibrium strategy used by a player is nondecreasing, and we also show that players converge to each of these equilibria via natural myopic learning dynamics; as we argue, these dynamics are more reasonable than the standard best response dynamics. We also provide sensitivity results, where we quantify how the equilibria of such games move in response to changes in parameters of the game (e.g., the introduction of incentives to players).