Evolution of Coordination in Social Networks: A Numerical Study

TL;DR

This study uses numerical simulations to explore how network structures influence coordination game outcomes, revealing that community clustering promotes socially efficient behaviors and can lead to polarization.

Contribution

It demonstrates through simulations that community structure in social networks enhances the selection of efficient equilibria in coordination games.

Findings

Community clustering promotes efficient social outcomes.

Local network effects can lead to social polarization.

Clustering influences equilibrium selection in coordination games.

Abstract

Coordination games are important to explain efficient and desirable social behavior. Here we study these games by extensive numerical simulation on networked social structures using an evolutionary approach. We show that local network effects may promote selection of efficient equilibria in both pure and general coordination games and may explain social polarization. These results are put into perspective with respect to known theoretical results. The main insight we obtain is that clustering, and especially community structure in social networks has a positive role in promoting socially efficient outcomes.